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On August ™ 9 T985, the U.S. District Court 
for the Western H*strict of Pennsylvania in 
United States v.Westlnghguse Electric 
Corporation, DCWPA Mo. 11710, held that the 
Department of Defense Inspector General (DOD 
IG) could subpoena internal audit reports 
from Westinghouse Electric Corporation and 
could authorize the Defense Contract Audit 
Agency (DCAA) to review those reports as part 
of the DOD IG's investigation. Although 
Westinghouse subsequently obtained a stay of 
the district court order, pending appeal to 
the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, the case 
will certainly encourage DCAA to increase its 
demands for contractors',management data, 
pursuant to its new found independent sub­ 
poena authority.
DCAA, as the largest auditing agency in the 
Department of Defense, under pressure from 
Congress and the DOD IG, has recently 
expanded its efforts to obtain contractor 
records. This is due to certain perceived 
weaknesses in the access by DCAA to records, 
DCAA's handling of suspected fraud and the 
adequacy of the internal audit controls of 
corporations subject to audit.
In a January 31, 1985, memo to DCAA Director 
Charles O'Starrett, Jr., DOD Comptroller 
Robert W. Helm outlined the seven elements of 
a proposal being considered to improve the 
effectiveness of DCAA. These elements 
include:
1. Identification of needed regulatory and 
statutory changes regarding records 
retention and access to records that 
would improve accomplishment of the 
contract audit mission. This would 
broaden the current definition of 
records to include computerized and 
other types of data and revising DOD 
record retention rules.
2. Obtaining subpoena authority for DCAA. 
DCAA at that time relied upon the DOD IG 
subpoena authority to obtain records 
otherwise unobtainable from con­ 
tractors. Now, DCAA has independent 
subpoena authority.^
3. Clarification and strengthening of the 
role of DCAA as primary advisor to the 
contracting officer on accounting and 
financial matters. This^would include 
increasing the auditor's participation 
in negotiations.
4. Increasing the frequency and breadth of 
DCAA's audits of defective pricing.
5. Assessing audit coverage of labor and 
fringe benefits of major contractors.
6. Strengthening management by headquarters 
DCAA and regional headquarters of field 
activities and operations. This would 
include analyzing reporting needs of 
management levels within DCAA and eval­ 
uating the effectiveness of existing 
peer review programs.
7. Improving reporting by DCAA to the 
comptroller.
A further indication of an expansionist DCAA 
role is seen in Deputy Defense Secretary 
William H. Taft's granting the audit agency 
responsibility for determining final overhead 
rates at all defense contractor locations. 
In an August 5, 1985, memo to Assistant 
Secretary of Defense Acquisition and 
Logistics James Wade and Comptroller Robert 
Helm, Taft extended the procedures used by 
DCAA to determine final overhead rates at 
smaller contractors to the larger contractor
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locations where final overhead rates had 
traditionally been established through pro­ 
curement negotiation by administrative con­ 
tracting officers (AGO).
Since the spring of 1984, DCAA has pushed for 
access to additional contractor records 
including profit plans, management studies, 
accounts unrelated to expenditures on govern­ 
ment contracts, and other data previously 
considered off-limits. The current objec­ 
tive, however, is internal audit reports.
DCAA asserts it has a right to these internal 
cost records based on statute, contract 
clauses and accounting standards. If the 
contractor refuses to produce the desired 
internal cost records, DCAA has threatened to 
suspend all costs of the corporation's 
Internal Audit Department, to recommend to 
the ACO suspension of the corporation's 
Internal Audit Department costs which are 
included in any progress payment requests, to 
report the lack of cooperation to the 
Procurement Contracting Officer fPCO) for use 
in negotiating the contractor's future profit 
or fee, and, to question the allowability of 
other costs based on the alleged impact of 
the acceptability of the company's accounting 
system.^
In connection with these efforts, DCAA sought 
independent subpoena power for those cases 
where a contractor denied it access to 
records. Previously, DCAA, as it did in the 
Westinghouse case, had to go to the DOD IG in 
order to obtain a subpoena.
The Westinghouse Case Background
The litigation resulting in Westinghouse 
arose as a result of DCAA's demands to per- 
form an operational audit of Westinghouse*s 
internal audit department and to obtain 
access to the company's internal audit 
reports. Westinghouse declined to provide 
access to the information DCAA sought 
because, it contended, the internal audit 
reports did not reflect the incurrence and 
allocation of cost. Westinghouse also argued 
that such an audit was not authorized by the 
audit clauses of the contract.
In two memoranda dated August 14 and August 
16, 1984, nCAA requested that the DOD IG 
issue a subpoena for all documents generated 
by the Westinghouse internal audit department 
relating to any of the organizational ele­ 
ments which allocate costs to DOD contracts. 
The August 16 memo stated that the 
Westinghouse internal audit reports were 
needed in order to allow DCAA to reach an 
opinion on the reasonableness and
allocability of the internal audit costs 
incurred and allocated to government con­ 
tracts by Westinghouse. The two memoranda 
stated further that the internal audit 
reports, "are needed for audit reviews which 
include in their objectives and the promotion 
of economy and efficiency in the prevention 
of fraud and abuse ..." (SIC). 3
On September 27, 1984, the DOD IG issued a 
subpoena to Westinghouse for records pertain­ 
ing to internal audits for the period of 
January 1, 1982, through October 1, 1984, for 
which costs had been incurred by Westinghouse 
and had been allocated to defense contracts 
and subcontracts. The subpoena limited the 
demand for production of documents to those 
records "... which are necessary in the 
performance of the responsibility of the 
Inspector General under the Inspector General 
Act to conduct and supervise audits and 
investigations relating to, and to promote 
economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in the 
administration of, and to prevent and detect 
fraud and abuse in, the programs and opera­ 
tions of the Department of Defense."^ 
Westinghouse refused to comply with the 
subpoena.
On December 27, 1984, the DOD IG filed a 
Petition for Enforcement of Administrative 
Subpoena by the Government^ which was 
granted by the District Court'on August 4, 
1985. In addition to briefs filed by the 
government and Westinghouse, the Chamber of 
Commerce and the Institute of Internal 
Auditors filed amicus curiae briefs in 
support of Westinghouse's position.
The Contractor's Position and The Court's 
Response
Westinghouse raised a number of arguments 
directed at the propriety of the subpoena. 
First, Westinghouse argued that since DCAA 
did not have subpoena power, the DOD IG was 
illegally acting on its behalf. The court 
rejected this argument, finding that the DOD 
IG was acting on its own behalf and was 
merely using the DCAA as its delivery agent.
The court also rejected Westinghouse's 
argument that the DOD IG's authority to 
access data was limited by the standards set 
for the GAO. The court noted that the 
subpoena power granted to the DOD IG by 
congress was greater in scope than the 
examination of records authority granted to 
the General Accounting Office."
Westinghouse contended next that the sub­ 
poena was too broad, and that disclosure of 
audit reports would compromise confidential
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data unrelated to its defense business. The 
court found that since: (i) Westinghouse 
released its internal audit reports to its 
independent certified public accountants, 
(ii) these CPA's discharge a "public respon­ 
sibility", and (iii) similarly the DOD IG 
also performed a public responsibility, the 
DOD IG should be given the same access to the 
reports. The national policy of preventing 
waste, fraud and abuse in government con­ 
tracts, the court noted, outweighed any 
"chilling effect" on the ability of the 
contractors' internal auditors to perform 
their official duties. 7
Since Westinghouse, for the purposes of per­ 
forming its internal audits, combined funds 
attributable to government contracts with 
those of its commercial contracts, the court 
further held the contractor could not effec­ 
tively use this situation to deny the DOD IG 
access to these reports. If Westinghouse had 
kept separate records of its government con­ 
tract business and its related internal audit 
operations, it might have persuaded the court 
that the DOD IG could not intrude upon its 
corporate reports. Moreover, the court noted 
Westinghouse was paid in excess of $500,000 
in 1983 for audit costs, and thus "sold its 
right to secrecy and opened the door to the 
government and its right to inspect the 
internal audit . . . reports." 8
Finally, the court rejected the notion that 
compliance with the subpoena would be unduly 
burdensome. Noting that in U.S. v. Firestone 
Tire and Rubber Company,^ the U.S. District 
Court for the District of Columbia upheld a 
government subpoena, despite a claim that it 
would require 100,000 hours or more than $2 
million to comply, the court observed that 
the subpoena in the instant case had not been 
shown to be unreasonble or unduly burden­ 
some. 10
Impact of Decision
Unless the District Court decision in the 
Westinghouse case is reversed or modified 
through judicial appeal, executive regula­ 
tion, or congressional enactment, ft would 
appear that there will be nothing to pre­ 
vent either DCAA or the DOD IG access to 
contractor records, where only "indirect" 
cost allocation—costs which are not the 
subject matter of the internal audit report 
(or other management document)—is the sole 
existing factor. If DCAA is granted the 
right of access to any one type of internal 
management record (i.e. internal audit 
department reports)—to determine the 
reasonableness and allocability of the costs 
incurred by the organizational unit
generating the particular type of record— 
DCAA would have, by simple analogy and logic, 
the right to demand access to all other 
internal management records where any portion 
of the costs for generating such records is 
allocated to government contracts. Keep in 
mind only a small fraction of their costs 
might be allocated to government contracts 
since the costs of generating internal 
management records for either commercial or 
government contracts find their way into an 
indirect cost pool, which is then allocated 
to individual contracts. Thus, DCAA could 
claim a right to obtain virtually every 
report, planning and decision document and 
working paper a company generates. 1 ' This, 
however, should not be the case.
First, it is well established in the "Rights 
in Data" area that indirect costs, such as 
independent research and development (IR&D) 
expenditures, although indirectly reimbursed 
by the government through overhead rates, are 
nevertheless considered private expen­ 
ditures. 1 ^ Accordingly, the government 
acquires no rights in any invention, process, 
etc. resulting from IR&D effort even though 
it is indirectly and partially reimbursed by 
the government through the contractor's 
indirect costs. By analogy, therefore, the 
government should have no right to internal 
audits, even though indirectly reimbursed by 
the government, since they should also be 
considered private expenditures.
Second, is audit access, through reimburse­ 
ment of indirect costs, absolute or a matter 
of degree based on a quantum theory and 
analysis? In Westinghouse, the court found 
that since the government had paid in excess 
of $500,000 for internal audits done by 
Westinghouse, the government in effect 
"owned" those internal audit reports. If the 
amount allocated to internal audits was, 
however, only a de minimus amount, would the 
government still have unlimited access? If 
the government is entitled to access through 
the mere indirect payment of $1.00, it may be 
necessary for contractors—as a defense 
against internal audit report access—to (i) 
allocate internal audit costs to the indirect 
pools (per the established accounting system) 
and then (ii) remove the allocable amount 
from the pool when seeking cost reimburse­ 
ment. The same principle would have to be 
applied to forward pricing rate agreements to 
ensure that firm fixed contracts are purged 
of such costs. Only procurements based on 
price analysis (not cost analysis) would 
conceivably escape such treatment. In this 
way, contractors could then argue that the 
government has not acquired any right in
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those internal audit reports since the con­ 
tractor has specifically excluded payment for 
those costs,
A third question that arises is whether any 
commingling of commercial and government 
accounts justifies government access to all 
commercial as well as government data. If 
there are any internal audit reports which 
include Information from government contracts 
•Which are subsequently made part of the total 
corporate audit, does that constitute suf­ 
ficient "commingling* to allow the government 
complete access* to all corporate records? If 
it does, contractors must clearly segregate 
all government accounts and take other, steps 
necessary to protect commercial "
Finally , the Hestlndhouste court's determina­ 
tion that tiie^ifjx>^r~yts Issued for a 
legitimate purpose wftliii the scope of the 
DOD IS 1 s authority, Mkes It questionable 
whether DCM now needs Its own subpoena 
power* The court ftund that at the time of 
the Issuance of the subpoena, the DOD 16 had 
personal interest , official curlosl ty , and 
suspicion that ifesti nghouse !| s refusal to 
produce the Internal audits, plus other 
surroun d if circumstances required an Inves- - 
ti gia.fi on to- <H scharge the 16 ' s respons 1b 1 1 - 
1 ties' to the DOD and the public.- The court 
also recognized that the 16 had Independently 
determined that there was a need! for the 
subpoena and was Issuing the subpoena for Its 
own purposes and not purely for the DCAA. 
Even though the. recently enacted DCAA 
subpoena, authority Is less extensive than the 
DOD' I6's, this review level, however limited 
it vty.be, is eliminated,' 1* DCAA has carte 
blanche authority1 to inspect a contractor's 
'records.
Conclusion
testl nghouse decision is no doubt the
first chapter of 'What will be a long-running 
"access to records" drama. There will be 
greater insight when the appellate process 
has been exhausted by the litigants. Since 
DCAA has received its own statutory subpoena 
power, and therefore the "procedural" ques­ 
tions springing out of the DOD IG/DCAA reia- 
tlonshlp in Westi nghouse may be of little 
future significance, the extent of that 
subpoena authority is of great importance.
It is the "substantive" questions raised by 
Westi nghouse and noted above that have an 
ominous portent. Most notably, either 
appellate court review, executive branch 
regulation, and/ or congressional oversight 
must ultimately address the fundamental 
proposition posed by Westinghouse: Is
government reimbursement of an indirect cost 
in and of itself a sufficient basis to give 
it a right to access documents, records, etc. 
associated with that indirect cost-generating 
function? In addressing this question in 
whatever forum (legislative, judicial or 
executive), the ultimate answer--!f it 
sustains the district court's premise--could 
have a very significant adverse impact on the 
private sector/government relationship. 
Those companies infused with a dynamic, 
entrepreneurial management with an election 
to focus on the commercial marketplace may 
conclude that government business is not 
worth the price of such government access and 
intrusion into affairs of little, if any, 
direct bearing on government contracted 
work. As a policy, the "best and the 
brightest" should be attracted, not repelled, 
to solving the government's procurement
needs. 15
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Department of Defense Fiscal 
Year 1986 Authorization Act (P.I. 99-""45) 
Subpoena of Defense Contractor Records 
amended Section 2313 of Title 10, United 
States Code by adding
"(dKi) the Director of the Defense 
Contract Audit Agency (or any successor 
agency) may require by subpoena the produc­ 
tion of books, documents, papers, or records 
of a contractor, access to which is provided 
to the Secretary of Defense by subsection 
(a) or by section 2306m of this title."
?See, "Has DCAA overstepped its 
authority under the audit clause?" by W. 
Adams and J. Gallagher, Contract Management, 
November, 1984, at 17.
3u.S. v Westinghouse Electric 
Corporation, Nisc. So. n/io, slip op. at 11 
(W.D. PA, Aug. 14, 1985K
d :u, at 2.
F I<rt, at 2.
6 In Powsher v. Merck & Company, Inc., 
460 U.S. 8Z4 (1983), a divided Supreme Court 
ruled that the federal access to records 
statutes generally don't authorize the 
General Accounting Office to examine con­ 
tractor's indirect cost records. The court 
allowed that contractors could withhold 
records concerning research and development 
and other indirect costs, except to the 
extent that these costs are identified with 
a particular government contract.
^Westinghouse at 55.
8 Idl, at 56.
9455 F. Supp. 1072 fD.C.D.C. 1978).
10Westinghouse at 48-49. "The 
respondent states that compliance with the 
subpoena would require approximately 3700 
hours of effort and $55,000 in direct repro­ 
duction costs (a!though the government has 
not required that the documents be copied, 
only made available for inspection), in 
order to produce the 920 internal audit 
reports that relate to DOD contracts . . . 
I find that the subpoena in the instant case 
has not been shown to be unreasonable or 
unduly burdensome."
11 ^ee Machinery and Allied 
Products Institute Bulletin No. W598, August 
zi, 1985, where the same conclusion is 
advanced.
^Defense Procurement Circular No. 22 
(29 Jan. 1965).
13See, "Confronting the DOD "Access 
to Records" Offensive" by C. Kipps, J. 
Carl son and A. Rrown, 43 Federal Contracts 
Report, June 3, 1985, at 1032, for an 
analysis on how contractors should protect 
records.
subpoena authority amended 
10 U.S.C. 2313 to grant DCAA the right to 
require production of those books, docu­ 
ments, papers or records of a contractor 
which DCAA has a right to review pursuant to 
23l3fa) and 10 U.S.C. 2306m. Section 
2313fb) provides that the examination of 
records would involve records that directly 
pertain to and involve transactions relating 
to the contract. This is much more limited 
than the DOD IG : s subpoena power set forth 
in the Inspector General Act of 1978, as 
amended. 5 U.S.C. Appendix 56(a)(4) and 28 
U.S.C. 1345.
December il, 1985, DCAA issued a 
new regulation governing the process of 
subpoenaing defense contractor records, 
implementing the provisions of Pub. L, 
99-145. The regulation outlines that the 
DCAA director is responsible for issuing 
subpoenas and for providing the Secretary of 
Defense an annual report on the use of the 
subpoena authority. Pursuant to the regula­ 
tion, the DCAA general counsel is tasked 
with reviewing subpoena requests to make 
sure they are legal and with notifying the 
Justice Department if the subpoena needs to 
be enforced.
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